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[Sac. No. 5684. In Bank. May 4, 1945.) 
BILI.JY BURGESS, a Minor,etc. et al., Appellants, v. SAll.I-
DEL A. CAHILL et al., Defendants; H. P. GARIN 
COMP ANY (n (;orTlOrntion). Ff''Ipondent. 
/ 
[1] Trial-Direction of Verdict-Condition of Evidence Authoriz-
ing.-A court may direct a verdict in favor of defendant ollly 
when, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving plaintiff's 
evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, indulging 
.in every legitimate inference which may be drawn therefrom, 
the result is a determination that there is no evidence of suf-
ficient substantiality to support a verdict in his favor. 
[2] :Automobiles-Persons Liable-Lender-Purpose of Statute.-
It is the legislative purpose of Veh. Code, § 402, to protect 
innocent third persons from the careless use of automobiles, 
and to make this protection paramount to the rights of an 
owner who has permitted the use of his ear by others even 
though he, personally, is not guilty of negligence. 
[8] ld. - Persons Liable - Lender - Purpose of Statute. - Veh. 
Code, § 402, defines an automobile owner's liability in cases 
where the principle of respondeat 6f,tperior is inapplicable, in 
order to make him liable for the negligence of any person to 
whom he has expressly or impliedly given permission to oper-
[lJ See 24 CaLJur. 913. 
[2] See 2 Ca1.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. 478; 5 Am.Jur. 697. 
iricK. Dig. References: [1] Trial, § 257; [2-4] Automobiles, 
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ate his car, and thus prevellt him from escaping liability by 
say~ng that his car was not being used in his bm;inesR or wn~ 
being operated without his authority. 
[4] ld. - Persons Liable-Lender-Foundation of Statutory Lia-
bility.-The foundation of an automobile owner's liabilit,' 
under Veh. Code, ~ 402, is the permission given to another t;i 
use an instrnmentality whir-h. if improperly nsed, is a dangeJ' 
and menace to the public. . 
[6] ld. -- Persons Liable-Lender-Possession by Employee-Per-
mission.-In an action for personal injuries sustained in a 
collision with defendant's automobile while being used by its 
employee, it was reversible error to direct a verdict in favor 
of the owner on the ground that there was no 8ubstantialevi-
denee of permission to the employee to use the car, where it 
was shown that the car was at the time of the accident being 
used by the employee without restrictions, and without eJJort 
by the owner to check the mileage· or the amount of gasoline 
used. 
[6] ld.-Persons Liable'-Lender-PossessioD by PersoD to Whom 
Permittee Entrusted Car.-Where the owner of an automobile 
permits its 1;lse and it is being driven by another with the COD-
sent of the permittee, who accompanies the driver, the owner 
is liable for the driver's negligence to the extent set forth in 
Veh. Code, §402. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Joaquin County. C. W. Miller, Judge. Reversed. 
Action against driver and owner of an automobile for dam-
ages for personal injuries and for wrongful death resulting 
from an automobile collision. Judgment in favor of owner 
pursuant to a directed verdict, reversed. 
Gumpert & Mazzera and Charles A. Zeller for Appellants. 
Neumiller & Ditz and C. H. Hogan for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-Plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment ... 
for the defendant H. P. Garin Co. entered pursuant to a 
directed verdict. No appeal was taken from the separate 
judgments eptered for the plaintiffs against the other de-
fendants. . 
[1] The settled rule is that a court may direct a ver.dict 
only when, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving plain-
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indulging in every legitimatc inference which may be drawn 
therefrom, the result is a determinatioll that thcre is no evi-
dence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiffs. (Estate of Lances, 216 Cal. 397, 400 r14 P.2d 
768]; Estate of Flood, 2]7 Cal. 763, 768[21 P.2d 579]; B·ur-
lingham v. Gray, 22 Cal.2d 87, 94 [137 P.2d 9].) Viewing the 
evidence in accordan<>e witll the rule. the following fact~ 
appear: 
The. defendant H. P. Garin Co. was engaged in a farming 
enterprise on Bouldin and other islands situated about eight 
miles northwest of Stockton. In 1942 this defendant employed 
Samuel Cahill as a mechanic to keep its farm machinery in 
repair. The company provided Cahill with a Ford pickup 
truck for his exclusive use while in its employ. The car was 
garaged at Cahill's home. It was used on many occasions 
for his personal business. and at least once on a fishing trip 
to Bouldin Island. The company furnished the oil and gaso-
line for the car but made no effort to check the mileage or 
the amount of fuel consumed. Printed stickers were attached 
to some of the company's cars prohibiting the use of the 
machines for private purposes, but none was attached to the 
ear in the possession of Cahill. On January 17, 1943, at 7 
o'clock p. m., Cahill, his wife and son, were riding in the car 
for the purpose of obtaining some plants and shrubs to be 
planted at the site of a new home. On this trip, and while 
Mrs. Cahill was driving, a collision occurred between the car ' 
and an automobile driven by Utah R. Thornburgh. AB a re-
sult of the accident Thornburgh and another person in his car 
were killed and others seriously injured. 
An issue arose on the trial as to whether Cahill was ex~ 
pressly prohibited from using the car for his personal pur-
poses, and therefore whether he had permission for its general 
use. Cahill testified that he at no time received instructions, 
either oral or written, restricting its use to company business. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury 
to return a verdict in favor of the defendant company on the 
ground that there was no substantial evidence that the Ford 
pickup was being operated at the tinle of the accident with the 
permission of the owner of the vehicle. The jury returned 
a verdict' in compliance with that instruction and judgment 
was entered accordingly. 
The assertea liability of the defendant corporation is based 
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"Every owner of a motor vehicle lli liable and responsible 
lor the death of or injury to person or property resultIng from 
negligence ill the operation of such motor vehicle, in the busi-
ness of such owner or otherwise, by any perSOll using or oper-
ating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such 
owner, and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to 
the owner for all purposes of civil damages." 
It becomes necessary to determine whether the trial court 
correctly ruled that there was insufficient evidence to go to the 
jury on the question of permission of the employer for the 
general use of the car by the defendant Cahill. 
Prior to the enactment of the imputed liability statute the 
general rule was that the owner of an automobile who was not 
present at the time of the negligent act which caused injury 
to a third person could not be held liable unless it was shown 
that the person in charge was the agent or servant of the owner 
and at the time was engaged in his service. (Buelke v. Leven-
stadt, 190 Cal. 684 [214 P. 42].) 
[2] A reading of the language of the statute and a review 
of the decisions in this state reveal that the legislative purpose 
in the enactment of section 1714% of the Civil Code (now sec-
tion 402 of the Vehicle Code), was to protect innocent third 
parties from the careless use of automobiles and that this 
protection should be paramount to the rights of. an owner 
who has permitted the use of his car by others even though he, 
personally, was not guilty of negligence. The wording of the 
statute is clear and indicates that purpose. [8] The statute 
defines the owner's liability in cases where the principle of 
respondeat superior is inapplicable, in order to make the owner 
liable for the negligence of any person to whom he had ex-
pressly or impliedly given permission to operate his car. 
(Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454, 457 [139 P. 645, 147 A.L.R. 
861], citing Bayless v. Mull, 50 Cal.App.2d 66 [122 P.2d 608] ; 
Plaumbo v. Ryan, 213 App.Div. 517 [210 N.Y.S. 225].) The 
legislation was plainly intended to enlarge the liability of the 
nonculpable owner of a motor vehicle for its operation on a 
public highway. [4] The foundation of the statutory lia-
bility is the permission given to another to use an instrumen-
tality which if improperly used is a danger and menace to the 
public. . 
In construing the statute earlier cases have seemed to turn 
... 
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on the question of knowledge 01' information 011 the part of 
the owner that the vehicle was bein~ driven by the perSOll 
with whose negligence he is sought to be charged, before im-
plied permission could be inferreJ. For exalllple, in How-
land v. Doyle, 6 Cal.App.2d 311 [44 P.2r1 453], it was sDid: 
"A persoll cannot be said to have permitted that of which 
he had no knowledge or information," citing Bradford v'. 
Sargent, 135 CaLApp. 324, 332 [27 P.2d 93]. But in Burford 
v. Huesby, 35 Cal.App.2d 643 [96 P.2d 380], it was recognized 
that prior knowledge was not necessary in order that implied 
. permission be inferred, and that knowledge or information of 
the intendeG use of the car had referenC'C' to the eJement of 
"express" as opposed to "impJied" consent. 
The defendant relics on the cases of Henrietta v. Evans, 10 
Cal.2d 526 [75 P.2d 1051], and Engsil'orn v. Auburn Auto. 
Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [77 P.2d 1059], where it was held 
that use by the permittee beyond certain express restrictions 
was without permission. They are not determinative here. 
There was no question in those cases of either express or im-
plied permission for general use. 
[5] Here the employer and employee relationship existed. 
The defendant employer gave exclilsive possession and per-
mission for the use of the vehiele to its employee, and, accord-
ing to the testimony lI10st favorable to the plaintiff, without 
restrictions upon its use, without effort to check the mileage, 
or the consumption of gasoline or otherwise supervise or 
limit the use of the car. 
Evidence of employer and employee relationship together 
with the other factors mentioned would support an inference 
that the vehicle was being driven with the permission of the 
owner. (Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457 [126 P.2d 868J; 
Hicks v. Reis, 21 Cal.2d 654. 659 [134 P.2d 788], and cases 
cited. ) Those cases involved a similar relationship and evi-
dence on the issue of permissive use. In the case of Blank v. 
Ooffin a judgment entered on a directed verdict in favor of the 
defendant owner was reversed. It was held in the Hicks case 
on the appeal from the judgment against the owner, that the 
trier of the facts was justified in inferring that permission 
existed. 
The defendant owner refers at length to evidence in its 
favor and in confii('t with the evidence favorable to the plain-
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is l'eDdily cOllceded but it mny not influence t]le result on an 
appeal of this charactpr. 
[6] The fact thnt at Ill(' tim!' of the RP('id(,llt the wif(' of 
the defendant Cahill was operating the vehicle WOll1d not de-
fent recoyery-. Mr. Cahill was in the car and his wife was 
driving with his C'OJll'Wllt. If an automobile i.~ ]wing dl'i\,{~11 by 
another with the consent of the permittee, where th(' permittf'€' 
nccompanies the driyer. th(' owner is lia hIe to t h(' ext(,111 set 
forth in section 402 of the Vehicle Codp. (Hicks v. Reis, 
supra; Sutton v. Tanger, 1]5 Cn1.App. 267 [1 P.2d 521]; 
Hughes v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal.App.2d 349 f37 P.2d 99]; 
Annstrong v. Sengo, 17 Cal.App.2d 300 [61 P.2il 118FQ. (Jf. 
Souza v. Oortis, supm.) 
It follows that a directed verdict was improperly ordered. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal and 
agree that the evidence was sufficient to justify the trier of 
fact in determining that the H. P. Garin Co. had given its 
consent to the operation by Cahill of the Ford pickup truck at 
the time and place of the accident which is the subject of this 
action. In my opinion it was not necessary for plaintiffs to go 
further than to establish the fact that the automobile carne into 
Cahill's possession lawfully, and that he had the permission 
of the owner to operate it upon the highway, in order to 
fasten liability upon the owner for damages resulting from 
its negligent operation. 
The language. of section 402 of the Vehicle Code is clear and 
is not susceptible to the interpretation that an owner may give 
his permission to the operation by a third person of his auto-
mobile upon a public highway and restrict his liability for 
the negligent operation thereof by limiting such operation 
to time ot' place. The obvious purpose of the Legislature in 
the enactment of said section was to protect persons who might .... 
be injure;d as the result of the negligent operation of automo-
biles by persons other than the owners thereof who are operat-
ing the same with the permission of such owners. When a per-
son entrusts the operation of his automibile to a third person 
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person an instrumentality which may be used to cause injury 
or Jeath to innocent persons who may become victims of his 
negligent use of such instrumentality. For this reason, the 
Legislature wisely saw fit to place liability upon the owner 
for such negligent operation. If the Legislature had intended 
that the owner should have the right to limit his liability by 
restricting the operation of such automobile to a specific time 
or place, it could have so stated, but it did not do so for ob-
vious reasons. The protection which the statute was designed 
to afford would be clearly reduced by permitting the owner 
to so limit his liability. The owner can protect himself by 
insurance against any risk he may assume by permitting the 
operation of his automobile by third persons, while a victim 
of the negligent operation of such automobile suffers the same 
loss whether the automobile is being operated with or without 
the permission of the owner. 
In my opinion such cases as Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Ca1.2d 
526 [75 P.2d 1051], and Engstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales 
Corp., 11 Ca1.2d 64 r77 P.2cl 1059], are contrary to the inten-
tion clearly expressed by the Legislature by its enactment of 
section 402 of the Vehicle Code and should be overruled. The 
views expressed by the court in those cases indicates that the 
trend of the philosophy of the law at that time was to protect 
the owner of the automobile who voluntarily permitted a third 
person to make such use of it that an innocent victim was 
caused to suffer damages which would not have occurred ex-
cept for the owner's voluntary act in permitting the use of 
such instrumentality by a third person. In my opinion the 
Henrietta and Engstrom cases were erroneously decided. The 
basic concept and philosophy underlying these decisions is out 
of harmony with the purpose and object of the legislation em-
braced within section 402 of the Vehicle Code, and this court 
should now declare the law to be that owners of automobiles 
who voluntarily permit their operation by third persons are 
liabll3 to per~ns who suffer injuries as the result of the negli-
gent operation of such automobiles regardless of whether the 
persons operating sucn automobiles violate the instructions 
of the owner. as to time, place, or manner of such operation . 
. EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal upon 
the ground tpat the evidence upon the issue of Cahill's per-
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question of fact fo1' the oetel'lllillatiull 01 the jury. But in 
reaching that conclusion, Mr. Justice Shenk states that the 
cases ofJIem'ietia Y. Evans, JO Ca1.2d 52G[75 P.2d JOG1], and 
EnrJstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [77 P.2d 
JOG!)], are not determinative of the present controversy. T1I:1t 
statcrnent is correct. in my judgment, but not because, as he 
said: "There was no question in' t.hose' cases of r1111er exprrss 
or implied permission for general use." 
In the Hrnriet1.a casr t.his court. held: "On [principle 1, 
there is no fUl1darnental ground of distinction between a limi-
tation of t.ime and Olle of purpose or place, in so far as per-
mission is concerned; and it. would seem clear that. a substan-
tial violation of either limitat.ion terminates the original ex-
press consent and makes t.he subsequent use without permis-
sion. For example, an owner might entrust his car to an-
other for the purpose of driving it to his home, or to a garage 
for repairs; and if the driver took the car out on a pleasure 
trip, it could hardly be contended that he was acting with 
the permission of the owner." The second decision affirmed 
a judgment for the defendant. As the only permission given 
Herndon to use the car was that he might have it for the 
particularly specified period, said the court, when that time 
had expired, he was not then driving it with the permission, 
either express or implied, of the owner. 
Were the court now considerIng a judgment rendered upon 
evidence showing, without conflict, that the truck of the Garin 
Company was turned over to Cahill solely for his use in going 
to and from the company's place of business and not to be 
driven on Sundays for personal errands, the rule of the prior 
decisions would require a determination that the owner was 
not liable for damages because of the accident. But the only' 
issue now presented is whether the directed verdict was proper. 
